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Abstract
The dominant cognitive model that accounts for the persistence of delusional beliefs in schizophrenia postulates that
patients suffer from a general deficit in belief revision. It is generally assumed that this deficit is a consequence of impaired
reasoning skills. However, the possibility that such inflexibility affects the entire system of a patient’s beliefs has rarely been
empirically tested. Using delusion-neutral material in a well-documented advice-taking task, the present study reports that
patients with schizophrenia: 1) revise their beliefs, 2) take into account socially provided information to do so, 3) are not
overconfident about their judgments, and 4) show less egocentric advice-discounting than controls. This study thus shows
that delusional patients’ difficulty in revising beliefs is more selective than had been previously assumed. The specificities of
the task and the implications for a theory of delusion formation are discussed.
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Introduction
Belief change is a complex process by which rational agents shift
from one belief state to another as a way to improve their
knowledge [1]. Every day we deal with a lot of information coming
from different sources that may have an impact on our belief
system. One obvious way belief change occurs is the expansion of
our belief set when we acquire new information. However, quite
often a new piece of information contradicts our knowledge and in
order to preserve the consistency of our beliefs we must be able to
consider that some of them are untrue and ought to be
abandoned. Evaluating and revising beliefs is a crucial ability as
it plays a central role in the flexibility of human cognition.
One can reasonably assume that a dysfunction in such a
mechanism would prevent an individual from correctly assessing
her/his beliefs and eliminating those that are patently false in light
of compelling counter-evidence. This could lead her/him to hold
ill-founded, irrational or even delusional beliefs. The latter are
defined as rationally untenable beliefs based on incorrect inference
about reality. These beliefs persist despite the evidence to the
contrary and are not ordinarily accepted by other members of the
person’s culture or subculture [2,3]. Deficit in belief revision will
not cause the abnormal or unrealistic content of these beliefs by
itself, but it could make these beliefs hard to assess and reject. This
idea has been largely developed by Langdon and Coltheart [4] (see
also [5,6]). They argue that the process of experiencing a delusion
is a composite of several impairments that cannot independently
explain the presence of a delusional belief. On the one hand, they
admit that perceptual aberrations, potentially coupled with
attributional biases, strongly contribute to generate the content
of bizarre delusions. On the other hand, they emphasize that such
factors are not sufficient to explain why delusional beliefs are
deeply entrenched instead of being ephemeral hypotheses doomed
to disappear. In particular they argue that having an anomalous
experience should not prevent individuals from accepting the
possibility that some dysfunction arises in their mind and that their
experience is thus inaccurate. Consistent with this view they
provide numerous examples of brain dysfunctions that result in
anomalous experiences without resulting in delusional beliefs. For
instance amputated patients who feel the anomalous presence of
their missing limb certainly suffer from some neurophysiological
dysfunction but do not firmly believe that their limb is still there
and do not become delusional. Even more strikingly, some brain-
damaged non-deluded patients may go through anomalous
experiences that are very similar to those of deluded patients. It
is thus not the case that experiencing a serious perceptual anomaly
leads to delusion.
To account for delusions, the authors thus postulate the
existence of another factor, namely a deficit in belief evaluation
and revision.
In line with this view, clinical observations show that deluded
patients, such as those suffering from schizophrenia, tend to hold
their delusional beliefs with a high degree of conviction and ignore
any evidence, arguments, or outside opinion that could lead them
to revise their views [3–4,7–9]. For instance, Freeman et al. [8]
found that when delusional patients (78% of whom suffered from
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through and asked to propose a different explanation than the
delusional one, the majority was unable to do so (76 out of 100
patients). The remaining few thought of one single alternative (21
out of 100 patients, and only 3 patients proposed two alternatives).
It has been proposed that the failure to revise one’s own
delusional beliefs and generate alternative beliefs may result from a
deficit in inductive reasoning and hypothesis testing, which
manifests itself in reasoning biases [4,9,10]. For instance, several
studies have reported that patients are prone to jump-to-
conclusions (JTC) biases. Indeed, when compared to controls,
schizophrenic deluded patients hold beliefs with less evidential
support and consequentially make more hasty judgements in
decision making tasks. They also show a higher level of confidence
when expressing their judgements and tend to make their decisions
on the basis of information that is immediately present in the
environment, thus ignoring previously acquired knowledge
[11,12]. Interestingly, Freeman et al. [8] reported that delusional
patients who were unable to consider alternative explanations
were also more prone to the JTC bias than those who did find an
alternative (see also [10]). Furthermore, patients tend to exhibit
dichotomous thinking and intolerance to ambiguity [10,13],
answering in extreme, absolute terms, such as ‘‘completely
certain’’, or ‘‘do not agree at all’’. They thus have difficulties
evaluating their answers and choosing more measured replies.
Such a behavioural tendency could prevent patients from being
more cautious while formulating an account of their experiences.
Although impaired reasoning skills could well account for a
general deficit in belief revision, the studies in which they are
reported do not directly show that delusional patients suffer from
such a deficit. However, an experimental study that explicitly
addressed this issue was that of Moritz and Woodward [14]. Using
non delusional material, they aimed to investigate whether
schizophrenic patients are less able to revise their false convictions
in general, and not only their delusional beliefs. In the task they
devised, delusional patients with schizophrenia saw a sequence of
picture fragments that gradually developed into a complete
identifiable picture (i.e. at each stage a new fragment appeared
so that the picture became increasingly recognisable). After each
new fragment, participants were presented with several interpre-
tations, which could match or mismatch the target picture, and
had to evaluate their plausibility. For example, a picture
progressively showing a mermaid could also initially suggest a
fish or a seal. The likelihood of these false interpretations was
supposed to decrease over time, whereas the interpretation
‘‘person in winter clothing’’ was highly improbable at any stage.
The results indicated that schizophrenic patients did not diminish
their probability ratings regarding the interpretations that became
implausible (e.g. the fish) to the same extent as did healthy controls
and other psychiatric patients. The authors therefore concluded
that schizophrenic patients exhibit a general bias against
disconfirmatory evidence (BADE, see also [15–18]).
Although Moritz and Woodward’s study [14] is highly valuable,
one should refrain from concluding that their results allow one to
firmly establish that schizophrenic patients suffer from a general
deficit in belief revision. First, in their task, patients did show
evidence of belief change in the right direction. Indeed, their
degree of belief regarding the correct interpretation (i.e. the
mermaid) significantly increased over time and this increase was
not less pronounced than for control participants. In other words,
they did not show any bias against confirmatory evidence (BACE)
and the authors did not report any evidence that their patients
discovered the correct interpretation with less ease than their
control participants. This result is a marker of a revision process
since patients show a preference for one answer over others, and
this preference is supported by a new piece of evidence disclosed as
the picture becomes identifiable.
Second, other cognitive deficits than a belief revision impair-
ment might account for the BADE score. It is well-established that
schizophrenic patients have difficulties in focussing their attention
and in overcoming potentially disruptive stimuli [19,20]. In order
to obtain a high BADE score, participants in Moritz &
Woodward’s task [14] need to pay attention to the entire set of
proposed interpretations. Given the relatively high number of
interpretations provided (up to 9), it might thus be the case that
patients focus more on the correct interpretation and subsequently
pay less attention to their evaluations of the incorrect interpreta-
tions.
Third, in order to establish a general deficit one needs to
explore various situations where such a deficit is likely to arise.
Since each task has its own peculiarities, any deficit reported in a
given situation may be specific to that situation. The greater the
variety of situations showing the same kind of deficit, the greater
the chance that such a deficit is general. As indicated below, it
might be the case that the belief revision impairment only afflicts a
selected category of beliefs. For reasons we suggest in the
discussion, this particular set of beliefs will be more difficult to
revise and will thus constitute what is called delusions. The work of
Woodward and Moritz is thus of high relevance since it explores
belief revision when more neutral beliefs are formed. However,
their task obviously involves its own specific characteristics and
thus one needs to go one step further and explore situations
including different features.
In the present study, beliefs were related to encyclopaedic
knowledge and the context of revision was that of an advice taking
situation. Since delusional beliefs are usually not accepted by other
members of the patients’ culture or subculture [2], patients often
come across other people’s opinions (family members, friends,
clinicians, etc.) which defy their own beliefs. Patients seem
impervious to arguments and suggestions provided by others,
and strongly reject objections to their delusions [9]. For instance,
clinical investigations of patients’ insight regarding their anoma-
lous experiences [21] , indicate that deluded schizophrenic patients
score low on items that test their receptiveness to correction from
others (some of these items were: (9) I know better than anyone
else what my problems are. (10) When people disagree with me,
they are generally wrong. (11) I cannot trust other people’s opinion
about my experiences. (12) If somebody points out that my beliefs
are wrong, I am willing to consider it) (see also [22]; and see [23]
for a review). Patients may even see critics as members of a
conspiracy [14].
In the wake of Moritz and Woodward’s work [14], the present
study aims to investigate whether the tendency to reject others’
opinions is general and extends to non-delusional beliefs. We thus
explore a very basic and well-investigated situation of social
influence that may lead people to revise their views: the individual
produces an initial estimate (usually quantitative) in a certain task,
then receives the estimate of another person, and ultimately makes
a final estimate. This typically illustrates what is referred to as an
advice taking situation in the decision making literature. The
difference between the initial and the final estimates offers a
measure of the extent to which people combine advice with their
own opinion. Results obtained with healthy participants indicate
that the weight assigned to advice varies according to a number of
factors such as the trustworthiness of the adviser [24] her/his
expertise [25], previous suggestions made by the adviser (i.e. her/
his reputation [26]), the distance of the advice from the others’
opinions [27], the number of advisers [28], etc. (see [29], for a
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show an egocentric advice discounting (EAD, as phrased by Yaniv) as
they tend to outweight their own opinion as compared to that of
the advisor(s). For example, if participant’s initial opinions are
assigned the value of 0, and the advice the value of 100, the final
opinions tend to be situated around 30 on average [26,27,30,31].
The present experiment involves a task devised by Yaniv
[26,27] which consists of responding to general knowledge
questions concerning dates of historical and popular events such
as, ‘‘When did Marilyn Monroe die?’’. After completing the
questionnaire, participants are once more presented with the same
questions but this time they also know other participants’ answers.
According to the general belief revision deficit hypothesis, deluded
schizophrenic patients should be less likely to take advice into
account and should display a stronger EAD than healthy controls.
Alternatively, this should not be necessarily the case if such a
deficit is not general and only affects a particular category of
beliefs Along with testing these hypotheses, the present experiment
also aims to investigate how the assimilation and rejection of
advice relates to the severity of the symptoms.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All participants gave written informed consent for the study
which was approved by the local Ethical Committee (Comite ´d e
Protection des Personnes, no. AFSSAPS: 2008-A01599-46). All
patients consented to participate in the research on their own
behalf. Prior to the task, the experimenters made sure that patients
had the capacity to consent by asking a series of questions about
their understanding of the study.
Participants
Thirty patients with schizophrenia (22 males, 8 females; mean
age: 37.3 years, SD: 8.8) and 30 control participants (17 males, 13
females, mean age: 39.6 years, SD: 11.7) participated in the study.
All patients fulfilled DSM-IV criteria of schizophrenia [2] with no
other psychiatric diagnosis on DSM-IV Axis I. Exclusion criteria
included history of neurological illness or trauma, alcohol or drug
dependence according to DSM-IV criteria, analphabetism, and
being over 60 years of age. All patients were receiving
antipsychotic medication and were clinically stable at the time of
testing (duration of illness: mean: 8 years, SD: 5.12). Comparison
participants reported no psychiatric problems, and were system-
atically matched with patients for sex, age, and years of education
(see Table 1). None of the participants were paid for taking part in
the study.
Clinical assessment
SAPS [32] and SANS [33] were used to obtain ratings for
positive and negative symptoms in the schizophrenia sample (the
mean scores are presented in Table 1). A disorganization score was
also computed by summing the following subscores: bizarre
behaviour, positive formal thought disorder (from the SAPS),
alogia and inappropriate affect (from the SANS). These items have
been shown to constitute regular and fundamental components of
the disorganization dimension [34]. Two patients had a SAPS
delusion subscore of 0 (no delusions). For the remaining patients,
the delusion subscore ranged from 2 (mild delusion) to 43 (severe
delusion).
Procedure and materials
Following Yaniv [26,27] we conceived a set of 35 general
knowledge questions related to world history (e.g. When was UNO
created?), French history (When was Napoleon Bonaparte
crowned emperor?) as well as famous popular cultural events
(When did Marilyn Monroe die? See Appendix S1, for the full set
of questions). The 35 questions were presented in French to
control participants and patients. In the first phase, participants
read these questions in a booklet and had to answer them by
indicating the year in which they thought each historical event
took place. Additionally, they also had to estimate their degree of
confidence in their reply on a 5 point Likert scale (1 – not sure at
all; 5 – completely certain). ‘‘Once the questionnaire was
completed the second phase began. Participants were told that
they would be given the same questions once again (in a new
booklet) but this time every question would be accompanied by an
estimate provided by another individual (i.e. the advice). Their
task was now to: 1) copy their initial answer and their initial degree
of confidence (i.e. those given in the first questionnaire) into the
new booklet, 2) read the new estimate presented (i.e. the advice)
and 3) give their final estimate that could differ, or not, from their
first one, accompanied by the degree of confidence in the new
answer.’’ (for an example of a trial in the second phase, see
Figure 1).
We did not indicate to participants whether the advice was
obtained from patients or from healthy individuals. They were
only told that those estimates came from people who were of
approximately the same age and education level as themselves and
who also took part in this study. We considered that providing
more details about the population of advisers might have biased
the extent to which they would have taken the advice into account.
On one hand, had we indicated that the opinions were obtained
from healthy participants, patients may have considered these
advisers to be more knowledgeable than them. On the other hand,
had we presented the advisers as suffering from any sort of disease,
patients might have considered these advisers as less competent. It
turned out that during the experiment, neither patients nor
controls inquired about who gave the advice. Following Yaniv
([27], Experiments 1 and 2) the 35 advice estimates were actual
responses provided by other individuals and they were presented
as being obtained from different individuals, each labelled by a
different number. Accuracy of the advice, which was measured by
the absolute number of years away from the correct response, was
12.3 years. During the task, participants were not given feedback
regarding their own level of accuracy nor did they receive any
information about the adviser’s degree of accuracy. It is only in the
debriefing phase that the correct dates could be shown to
participants.
Results
Accuracy and confidence: patients and controls perform
in a similar way
Accuracy was assessed by the measure of the absolute number
of years away from the correct response. For each participant the
averaged accuracy across the 35 questions was calculated. In the
control group the averaged accuracy was 28.2 years for the initial
answer and 15.8 years for the final answer. In the group of
patients, the averaged accuracy was 30.4 years for the initial
answer and 16.4 years for the final answer. Hence, participants of
the two groups showed a similar level of performance and tended
to change their answer and improved their performance after
receiving the advice (see Figure 2A). This was confirmed by
running an ANOVA with accuracy as the dependant variable,
participants’ group (Controls vs. Patients) as the between-subject
factor and the time of the question (before vs. after the advice) as a
within-subject factor. The ANOVA shows a main effect of the
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25) but no main effect
of group (F (1,58)=0.23, p.0.6) nor significant interaction
between these two factors (F (1,58)=0.18, p.0.6). The improve-
ment of performance can easily be explained by the fact that the
advice estimates were much more accurate than the initial
responses of the participants for both groups: 16.9 years better
for the control group (t-test=4.69, p,10-4) and 17.1 years for the
group of patients (17.1 years better, t-test=5.61, p,10-6). Note
that the difference of performance between controls and their
advice was similar to the difference of performance between
Table 1. Clinical and demographic characteristics of patients and controls.
Healthy controls N=30 Patients N=30 P value
Mean age in years (SD) 39.6 (11.7) 37.3 (8.8) 0.4
Mean years of education (SD) 12 (1.91) 11.6 (2.17) 0.45
Sex ratio (M/F) 17/13 22/8 0.18
Duration of illness in years (SD) 8 (5.1)
SAPS score (SD) 29 (27.4)
SANS score (SD) 31 (17.9)
Hallucinations score (SD) 4.5 (6.5)
Delusion score (SD) 11.9 (12.9)
Bizarre Behavior score (SD) 3.6 (3.2)
Formal thought disorder score (SD) 7.3 (8.8)
Affective flattening score (SD) 9 (7.9)
Alogia score (SD) 4.9 (5.4)
Avolition score (SD) 4.4 (3)
Ahnedonia-asociality score (SD) 8 (4.9)
Attention 1.5 (1.7)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034771.t001
Figure 1. Example of the second part of the experimental procedure. Participants had to copy their initial answer and degree of confidence,
read the advice presented and then give their final estimate along with a final confidence rating.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034771.g001
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(58)=0.04, p.0.9). The absence of difference in performance in
initial answers was not only quantitative but it was also qualitative
as the difficulty orders of the questions highly correlated between
the two groups (r=0.88, p,10
25) This means that both groups
had lower and higher accuracy for the same questions: difficult
questions (i.e. those which had the lowest level of accuracy) for the
patients were also difficult for the controls. Finally, the level of
accuracy (as measured by the number of years away from the
correct answer) and the number of education years did not
significantly correlate and for patients, the level of accuracy did
not significantly correlate with any of the clinical scores (all
R’s.2.32 and ,.17, all p’s..07).
The level of confidence was also similar across the two groups
and both controls and patients increased their confidence after
receiving the advice (see Figure 2B): The level of confidence rose
from 2.20 to 2.60 among controls and from to 2.12 to 2.87 among
patients. This pattern was confirmed by running an ANOVA with
the level of confidence as the dependent variable, the participants’
group (Controls vs. Patients) as a between-subject factor and the
time of the question (before vs. after the advice) as a within-subject
factor. The ANOVA shows a main effect of the time of the
question (F (1,58)=31.9, p,10
24) but no main effect of group (F
(1,58)=0.23, p.0.6) and a marginally significant interaction
between these two factors (F (1,58)=2.86, p=0.096) indicating
that controls’ confidence increased a bit more than that of patients.
Weight of advice: patients put weight more on the
advice than control participants
The weight of advice (WOA) is our main variable of interest as it
is a measure of the extent to which participants took the advice
into account in their final estimate. It is calculated with the
following formula [27]:
final estimate{initial estimate jj
adviceestimate{initial estimate jj
The WOA ranges from 0 to 1: it is equal to 0 when the participant
totally ignores the advice and proposes a final answer that is
identical to her/his initial answer; it is equal to 1 when the
participant gives up her/his initial answer and completely follows
the estimate of the advisor. It is equal to 0.5 when equal weights
are assigned to each opinion.
In order to obtain a well-defined estimate of WOA, the
following two criteria have to be met. First, the advice should differ
from the initial answer; otherwise one cannot distinguish between
a final answer sticking to the initial response and a final answer
adhering to the advice. Because the advice estimates were
randomly taken from a pool of actual estimates that were selected
before knowing participants’ answers, we were exposed to the risk
of such equalities. Indeed, 2.33% of the answers (2.29% of answers
in the Control group and 2.38% in the group of patients) turned
out to be identical to the advice and were thus excluded from the
WOA analysis. Second, the final answer should fall between the
initial answer and the advice. Exceptions to such criterion include
1) final answers which are even further away from the advice than
the initial answer (e.g. the participant initially answered 1970, s/he
received 1975 as an advice, and then finally answered 1968) and 2)
final answers which are even further away from the initial answer
than the advice (e.g. the participant initially answered 1970, s/he
received 1975 as an advice, and then finally answered 1977). The
rate of answers that did not meet this criterion represented 6.29%
of the total answers, (i.e. 5.62% of answers in the Control group
and 6.95% in the group of patients, t-test on the arcsin-
transformed proportions, t (58)=0.64, p.0.5) which were
excluded from the WOA analysis. Once these two exclusion
criteria were applied, we calculated, for each participant, the mean
WOA across the 35 questions. In line with the observations
reported by the literature, participants in the control group
showed egocentric advice discounting [27] as they put more
weight on their own estimate than on the advisor’s estimate: the
mean weight of advice for this group (0.39) was significantly lower
than 0.5 (t test on the arcsin-transformed proportions, t
test(29)=22.71, p,0.02 two-tailed). In contrast, patients showed
a more equal weighting between the two opinions: the mean
weight of advice for this group (0.54) did not significantly differ
from 0.5 (t test on the arcsin-transformed proportions, t
test(29)=0.7, p.0.4). Moreover, the comparison between the
two groups shows that Patients’ WOA is higher than Controls’
WOA (0.39 vs. 0.54, t test on the arcsin-transformed proportions, t
(58)=2.1, p,0.05, see Figure 3). Such a result obviously does not
support the prediction that patients should stick more with their
Figure 2. Accuracy and confidence: patients and controls
perform in a similar way. Accuracy (A): Mean number of years
away from the correct date; Confidence (B): Mean level of confidence.
Bars indicate standard error means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034771.g002
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WOA and the duration of illness did not significantly correlate
(r=0.08, p.0.6).
The mean weight of advice may leave the impression that
participants combine their own estimate to the advisor’s estimates.
For instance, a mean WOA of 0.30 could indicate that for each
trial participants modify their initial answer in such a way that
about 30% of the distance towards the advice has been covered.
However, as noted by Soll and Larrick [35] the distribution
underlying the WOA mean may be completely different. For
instance, participants could stick entirely with their own opinion
for 70% of the questions and fully adhere to the opinion of the
advisor for the remaining 30%. Such a pattern would be
inconsistent with the idea that most final estimates result from a
combination process but instead would reflect a choosing strategy.I n
fact, fine-grained analyses of the WOA distributions indicated that
the level of choosing was quite high and was largely underesti-
mated in past studies (see [35]). We thus looked more carefully at
the distribution underlying the WOA by examining the 967
individual data points of the control group ((30 participants635
questions) – 83 answers that did not meet the two above criteria)
and the 952 data points of the group of patients ((30
participants635 questions) – 98 answers that did not meet the
two above criteria). As shown in Table 2, this analysis revealed
that the rate of choosing was high for both groups: 80.4% of the
answers in the control group followed a choosing strategy
(WOA=0 or 1) and 81.4% of the answers in the group of
patients followed a choosing strategy. Moreover, in line with the
difference regarding the mean WOA between the two groups, the
modal WOA was equal to 0 among the group of controls while it
was equal to 1 among the group of patients (see Table 2). This
again shows that patients adhered more to the advisor’s estimate
than controls.
Finally, we analysed the relation between confidence and the
mean WOA. First, we examined the relation between the initial
level of confidence and the mean WOA. In both groups the two
measures were negatively correlated (controls r=20.48, p,.01;
patients r=20.44, p,.02) indicating that the less confident the
participants in their initial estimates, the more likely they are to
take advice into account. Second, we examined the relation
between the increase of confidence over time and the mean WOA.
In both groups the two measures were positively correlated
(controls r=0.52, p=.003; patients r=0.51, p,.005) indicating
that the more participants take advice into account the more their
level of confidence increases.
Regression analyses: The Weight of Advice predicts the
severity of clinical symptoms
Regression analyses were conducted to evaluate the influence of
WOA on patients’ clinical symptoms. In particular, we assessed
whether the WOA was predictive of the symptom severity on the
different dimensions of schizophrenia measured (SANS, SAPS,
and disorganisation scores). For each clinical score, we conducted
regression analyses using the mean WOA as a predictor variable.
We used both this raw score (simple linear regressions), or its
transformed values (simple non-linear regressions with logarith-
mic, polynomial, or exponential transformations). Models with the
highest adjusted R-squared (R
2) and a p-value,0.05 are reported.
The mean WOA significantly and positively predicted the SAPS
score (R
2=0.17, p=0.024) and several of its subscores, namely the
delusion subscore (R
2=0.19, p,0.017), the bizarre behaviour
subscore (R
2=0.18, p=0.02) and the formal thought disorder
subscore (R
2=0.14, p=0.04, see Figure 4). Thus, the more
patients followed the advisor’s opinion (and concomitantly gave up
her/his opinion), the more severe were those symptoms. The
mean WOA significantly and negatively predicted the anhedonia-
asociality subscore from the SANS (R
2=20.32, p,0.002, see
Figure 4). The disorganisation score was not found to be predicted
by patients’ WOA. This was also true when the WOA scores were
transformed.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent to which
delusional patients with schizophrenia modified their beliefs after
learning other people’s opinions. As in Moritz and Woodward’s
study [14], the beliefs at stake in the present experiment were not
delusion-specific nor were they emotionally charged but involved
neutral encyclopaedic knowledge. Participants were confronted
with other people’s opinions that could lead them to revise their
own views. The hypothesis of a general belief revision deficit
predicts that patients should stick more to their initial beliefs and
should thus reject more advice than control participants. The data
indicate that this was not the case as the opposite effect was
actually observed. Indeed, only control participants, but not
patients, did show evidence of Egocentric Advice Discounting.
Both groups changed their initial answer, but patients changed it
significantly more than controls. The strong tendency to reject
others’ opinions, which was previously reported when delusional
beliefs are at stake, did not manifest itself with the delusion-neutral
material used in this study. These data are thus at odds with the
hypothesis of a general belief revision deficit.
It is important to note that the difference between the two
groups with respect to WOA cannot be accounted for by a
difference in initial performance since both groups did equally
well. Had the patients been less accurate than controls in their first
answers they might have been also less confident and thus more
likely to take advice. One should also note that along with the
same level of performance, patients and controls also showed the
same degree of confidence in their initial answers. This factor
cannot therefore account for the difference in WOA either.
Moreover, the level of confidence expressed by the patients turned
out to be quite reasonable and mirrored that of controls. In both
groups, participants were more likely to take advice into account
when their confidence in the initial answer was low, and in both
groups confidence rose with the extent to which advice was taken
into account. However, patients’ confidence increased slightly
Figure 3. Patients put weight more on the advice than control
participants. The dashed line represents equal weight ascribed to
advice and initial opinions. Bars indicate standard error means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034771.g003
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general tendency (observed in both groups) to increase one’s own
confidence when taking advice more into account. Since patients
showed a greater WOA they also ended up with a greater increase
of confidence. In short, measures of confidence indicate that
patients did consider advice to be worthwhile. Ultimately, the
absence of overconfidence in patients’ initial judgements also
challenges the general deficit view according to which greater
belief entrenchment could have been expected in patients. Also,
the greater WOA for patients is unlikely to be accounted for by the
fact they are immersed in a medical environment where they are
used to following advice from medical staff. Indeed the mean
WOA and the duration of illness (which is an indirect, though
reliable measure, of duration of hospitalization) did not signif-
icantly correlate. Moreover, the greater WOA for patients cannot
be accounted for by ‘‘weakness of will’’ either as their mean WOA
and Avolition clinical score did not significantly correlate.
Table 2. Proportions of choosing and averaging in the two groups.
Choosing Averaging
Sticking with
one’s own opinion
(WOA=0)
Adopting the
opinion of the
advisor (WOA=1)
Combining one’s own opinion
with that of the advisor
(0,WOA,1) Total
Individual data point
Controls N=967 52,84% 27,51% 19,65% 100%
Individual data point
Patients N=952 36,45% 44,85% 18,70% 100%
Total 44,71% 36,11% 19,18% 100%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034771.t002
Figure 4. The Weight of Advice predicts the severity of clinical symptoms. The linear regression lines derived from the linear regressions
analyses between the Weight of Advice (explanatory factor) and patients’ symptoms are shown in red. The 95% confidence intervals for the
regression lines are shown in grey. Note that the correlation is positive for SAPS subscores (a, b, c), and negative for the SANS subscore (d).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034771.g004
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revise their beliefs? The specificities of the task obviously need to
be considered here. First, it should be noted that most of our
encyclopaedic beliefs are acquired through social transmission, as
we obtain them from various social sources such as teachers,
newspapers, TV, books or friends. They thus differ from beliefs
acquired only by oneself, which arise from direct perception or
inference. In this respect, encyclopaedic beliefs radically differ
from delusional beliefs and the kind of hypothetical beliefs
involved in Moritz and Woodward’s task [14]. The former
required trusting other people and accepting information they
communicate while the latter are entrenched on individual
cognitive mechanisms [36]. One could therefore speculate that
patients might show a deficit in belief revision but only when
individually acquired beliefs are at stake.
Second, it might be the case that when non-delusional neutral
beliefs are at stake, being in a situation where advice is available
may help patients revise these beliefs. This would again indicate
that when hints to revise are embedded within a social context
they are more likely to be effective. Such a claim would have to be
experimentally tested by comparing the impact of contrary
evidence when advocated by an individual to the impact of
contrary evidence available in the physical environment as in
Moritz & Woodward [14]. Of course, when it comes to delusional
beliefs, the social context probably has no impact as patients do
not change these beliefs when they are challenged by others [9].
Third, it is important to note that the degree of confidence in
the initial answer was relatively low in both groups, and one could
therefore conjecture that a deficit in belief revision arises only after
a certain threshold of belief entrenchment has been exceeded. In
line with this possibility, Woodward and colleagues [18] reported
that schizophrenia patients were actually willing to revise their
false beliefs when those beliefs were weakly entrenched and
observed that the bias against disconfirmatory evidence only
occurred with strongly held beliefs (note that such a finding
challenges a strong version of the general deficit assumption).
Although the present experiment did not aim to manipulate belief
strength, the degree of confidence can however be exploited to
explore the possibility that a deficit in belief revision concerns only
strongly held beliefs. We thus analyzed the WOA when
participants were highly confident in their initial answer (i.e.
degree of confidence equal or higher than 4 on the 5-point scale).
In order to obtain a relatively reliable score for each participant,
we only considered patients and controls that reported at least
three confident answers, resulting in 17 participants in the control
group and 15 in the patient group. Unsurprisingly, both groups
discounted advice, but as previously observed, patients did not do
so more than control participants (controls: mean WOA=.09;
median WOA=0; patients: mean WOA=.24; median.14; Mann-
Whitney U test, p=.14). The data thus do not support the
hypothesis that patients would revise their strongly held beliefs less
than controls. However, a better controlled experiment could be
devised in order to investigate the impact of belief strength in a
more systematic way. After all encyclopaedic beliefs are likely to be
of a little importance to the participants as they are not personally
relevant to them and do not carry rich emotional significance.
Hence, even though patients are confident in these beliefs, the
willingness to stick with them might be relatively weak. Future
research should thus investigate how belief content may
differentially affect belief revision in control participants and
schizophrenic patients. Overall, a deficit in belief revision may well
arise for non-delusional beliefs but the conditions and the type of
beliefs that would render such a deficit observable still need to be
thoroughly explored.
Finally, an important result that needs to be discussed is the
greater WOA for patients. How can one account for such a
finding? First of all, it is important to note that not all patients took
more advice into account. Regression analyses indicate that
patients who were more likely to take advice into account showed
greater positive symptoms (especially those who scored high on
delusion, bizarre behavior and formal thought disorder) while
those who were less likely to take advice scored high on the
anhedonia-asociality subscale. One explanation that could account
for the greater WOA among patients relates to the way they
weight and attend to information accessible in their environment.
Past studies indicate that deluded schizophrenic patients tend to
weight immediately available information much more than
background and contextual knowledge as compared to controls.
They are thus less likely to link a stimulus they are currently
processing to its proper context. This phenomenon has been
referred to as the Immediacy mechanism [37] and has been
claimed to account for a number of effects observed among
schizophrenic patients (see [38]). For instance, manifestations of
such a mechanism occur in language processing, with patients
exhibiting a clear penchant for processing words in isolation
[39,40].
In the present task, if patients pay more attention to immediate
than to remote stimuli they may therefore ascribe a greater weight
to advice than do controls, as advice is the last information
available in the environment when patients make their final
estimates. According to this account, belief revision is likely to arise
when contradictory evidence is the most immediately available
piece of information in the patient’s environment. In this respect,
an earlier study by Garety et al. [12] has reported a similar effect
to the one observed here. Indeed, the authors used a well-
investigated probabilistic inference task where participants are
requested to estimate from which of several jars a sequence of
colored beads has been drawn. They observed that schizophrenic
as well as paranoid patients were more likely to revise their
estimates when they came across an item that disconfirms their
initial hypothesis than control participants. For instance, if the first
three beads supported the hypothesis of a draw from Jar-A while
the fourth bead did not, deluded patients tended to abandon the
Jar-A hypothesis more than controls.
In a more recent paper Speechley et al. [41] provide further
details for the JTC bias in delusions. The authors show that
delusional patients manifest hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis
matches, whereas immediate information corroborating a given
hypothesis is overaccomodated (gains an abnormal degree of
importance). In our task the advice was the last information
available before the final answer and could thus be attributed a
heightened amount of salience. In the same vein McKay [42]
interprets the second factor in delusion formation of Davies et al.
[5] theory as a bias toward explanatory adequacy, meaning that
the individuals’ beliefs are primarily based on the available
perceptual information as if independently of prior beliefs. Both of
these views would suggest that advice being the last available
information in the environment it should have a stronger influence
of the patients’ responses in comparison to the control group.
In the present task, the very possibility of the Immediacy
mechanism will need to be further investigated as the initial
opinion might still have been part of the immediate environment.
Indeed, the advice and the initial opinion were presented almost
simultaneously as patients had to report their initial answer on a
line above the advice (a procedure that may involve effort and
attention to the initial answer). Moreover, given that there were
only two pieces of information (i.e. the initial opinion and the
advice) it is quite likely that both could be easily compared within
Advice Taking in Schizophrenia
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mechanism could account for belief revision in the present
experiment it would still need to be understood why the self
(symbolized by the initial opinion) could be so easily isolated from
the immediate environment (symbolized by the advice). Indeed, it
is quite intuitive to consider that the self is almost always
immediately accessible [43]. This leads us to consider another, and
possibly complementary, explanation.
Clinical observations and phenomenological accounts report
blurred delimitation between self and other in schizophrenia as
well as disturbed perception of «myness» (for instance see [44],
Case 12). This self-monitoring difficulty is thought to underlie
misattribution failure in thought and action (Schneiderian first-
rank symptoms, [45]) and serves as a basis for the hypothesis that
misattribution of internal speech is the cause of verbal hallucina-
tions [46]. Experimental manipulations with schizophrenic
patients show aberrant source monitoring for action representa-
tion [47] and recalling of produced vs. heard speech [48,49]. This
difficulty in internally distinguishing between self-generated and
externally provided information, along with the Immediacy
mechanism, could make patients mistake the advice for part of
their own knowledge. That is, when presented with the second
questionnaire, the response of some other participant would gain
as much salience as the patient’s own knowledge, thus making it
difficult to actually favor one perspective over the other. More
generally, this raises the question of how permeable the thoughts
of deluded schizophrenic patients are to others and the extent to
which these patients are prone to credulity. In future research it
may be worth investigating whether patients lack epistemic
vigilance [50] and are vulnerable to deception.
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